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RACIAL REVISIONISM
Shaun Ossei-Owusu*
THE ENIGMA OF CLARENCE THOMAS. By Corey Robin. New York:
Metropolitan Books. 2019. Pp. 301. $30.
INTRODUCTION
Court watchers and political commentators have described Clarence
Thomas as enigmatic for the majority of his judicial career. Consider some
titles about the justice: Clarence Thomas and the Tough Love Crowd: Counterfeit Heroes and Unhappy Truths; or Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence
Thomas; or Supreme Discomfort: The Divided Soul of Clarence Thomas. 1 Before her recent death, Justice Ginsburg was the second-most senior member
of the Court; Justice Ginsburg’s notoriety, however, never matched that of
Justice Thomas, her ideological opposite. 2 Today, Justice Thomas’s public
mystique arguably dwarfs that of any other justice on the Court. 3
In some ways, the aura around Justice Thomas is deserved; in other
ways, it is misplaced. It is warranted because of his uniqueness. Of the 115
people who have served as Supreme Court justices, he is 1 of 2 who were African Americans and 1 of 7 who were not white men. 4 He is one of the most

* Presidential Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law
School. J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; Ph.D., University of California,
Berkeley. This Review benefited from helpful conversations with and feedback from Regina
Austin, Guy-Uriel Charles, Trevor Gardner, Osamudia James, Jasmine Johnson, Melissa Murray, Dorothy Roberts, and K-Sue Park. All errors are my own.
1. RONALD SURESH ROBERTS, CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE TOUGH LOVE CROWD:
COUNTERFEIT HEROES AND UNHAPPY TRUTHS (1995); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON,
STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL
FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS (2007).
2 . See, e .g ., IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG (2015).
3. Other justices have also been described in interesting, though less drastic, terms and
not for as long. See, e .g ., JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS (2019); RUTH MARCUS, SUPREME AMBITION: BRETT
KAVANAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE TAKEOVER (2019); JOHN GREENYA, GORSUCH: THE
JUDGE WHO SPEAKS FOR HIMSELF (2018).
4. Jessica Campisi & Brandon Griggs, Of the 114 Supreme Court Justices in US History,
All But 6 Have Been White Men, CNN (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2020/09/25/politics/supreme-court-justice-minoritieshistory-trnd/index.html [https://perma
.cc/MNY3-AA84]; Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to Supreme Court, Takes
Constitutional Oath, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26
/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc
/E6PY-BCEJ].
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powerful Black people in the American legal system. Despite being a notably
silent jurist, 5 his legal opinions influence fields ranging from antitrust to
criminal justice to administrative law. 6 He became a Black conservative long
before it was an area of serious scholarly inquiry or political interest. In fact,
Thomas noted earlier in his career that such an amalgam was often dismissed by African Americans and conservatives. 7 He was Donald Trump’s
favorite justice; the president’s steady nomination of Thomas clerks confirms
that preference. 8
But there’s also less mystery than is suggested. The facts of his biography
are recounted in much of the scholarly and public writing about him. Thomas grew up in the Deep South as the country was transitioning out of Jim
Crow’s clutch. He was part of a cohort of Black college students who helped
diversify white institutions during a 1960s period of Black power. Thomas
graduated from Yale Law School in 1974. This was no small feat irrespective
of the race-conscious policies detractors gleefully point to when discussing
his anti-affirmative action positions. Thomas had a political metanoia in the
1970s and slowly transitioned into conservatism after being disillusioned
with white liberals and the unfulfilled aspirations of the previous decade. In
the 1980s, Thomas worked in different capacities in the Reagan Administration and was selected to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall on the Supreme
Court after a nineteen-month stint on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit (pp. 3, 13–14). Critics complained that the
nomination was unusually fast and evidence of undeservingness; nevertheless, Thomas’s time on the D.C. Circuit still gave him more federal appellate
judicial experience than some of his predecessors and colleagues. 9 He sur5. RonNell Andersen Jones & Aaron L. Nielson, Clarence Thomas the Questioner, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1185 (2017) (suggesting that notwithstanding the infrequency of his inquiries at
the Court, Justice Thomas asks good questions).
6. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (Thomas, J.) (ruling that steering
provisions do not violate antitrust law); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (Thomas, J.)
(ruling that district attorneys cannot be held liable for a prosecutor’s single violation of disclosure requirements); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV.
852, 870, 873 (2020) (discussing Justice Thomas’s questioning of Chevron’s constitutionality
and his once-fringe interest in the nondelegation doctrine, now shared by a number of other
justices).
7. CLARENCE THOMAS, WHY BLACK AMERICANS SHOULD LOOK TO CONSERVATIVE
POLICIES (1987), https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/why-black-americansshould-look-conservative-policies [https://perma.cc/3X85-3EDD].
8. Nicholas Casey, Passed By for Decades, Clarence Thomas Is a New Symbol of the
Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics
/clarence-thomas-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/G9PX-WN5W]; Emma Green, The
Clarence Thomas Effect, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2019/07/clarence-thomas-trump/593596/ [https://perma.cc/TTK2-HSAX].
9 . See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House:
Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 117–
18 (2005) (noting that “one would be hard pressed to argue that Thomas was unqualified for a
seat on the Court” since “there is no required set of qualifications”). Justices Hugo Black, Lewis
Powell, and Elena Kagan were elevated to the Court with no prior judicial experience. See Bri-
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vived a nomination process that included credible sexual harassment claims
by Anita Hill, a former colleague from his time at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Those allegations, offered by a Black
woman, were ultimately disregarded by a sociopolitical culture that had an
impoverished intersectional vocabulary and a poor understanding of how
race, gender, and power operate in the workplace. 10 Thomas is adored by
constitutional originalists and less embraced by Black Americans. 11 While
these facts may be interesting to some and normatively undesirable for others, they are descriptively straightforward.
Corey Robin’s The Enigma of Clarence Thomas 12 insists that there is
more underneath the hood. Robin, a left-leaning scholar of the right, seeks to
offer what the book flap describes as a “groundbreaking revisionist take on
the Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court justice everyone knows about but
no one knows.” His argument? Justice Thomas is a Black nationalist conservative who has been hiding in plain sight (p. 8). Justice Thomas, Robin
contends, sutures the economic conservatism of Thomas Sowell and Friedrich Hayek with the Black nationalist insights of Malcolm X and the Black
Panther Party. The result of this fusion is a distinctive legal worldview that
has been underexamined. Although a political scientist by training, Robin
takes an autodidactic approach to law to sustain his argument. He impressively wades through Thomas’s opinions, speeches, public writing, and the
niche area of scholarship on the Pin Point, Georgia–born jurist.
Many of the adjectives reviewers have used to describe the book are
spot-on: bold, provocative, and intellectually courageous. 13 Robin, for the
most part, avoids the accusations of bad faith that David Pozen has shown
are an unpretty feature of constitutional discourse, 14 and he generally refrains from the ideological gotcha-ism that one could easily engage in when
it comes to Justice Thomas’s legal oeuvre or that of any Supreme Court justice. Although political polarization is almost hackneyed as a description of
an P. Smentkowski, Hugo Black, BRITANNICA (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.britannica.com
/biography/Hugo-L-Black (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, at A1; Nina Totenberg, Should Kagan’s Lack of Judicial Experience Matter?, NPR (May 12, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126764692 [https://perma.cc/R948QWW3].
10. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL,
CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 402, 403–04 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
11 . See Ken Blackwell, Opinion, Don’t Forget Justice Clarence Thomas in Black History
Month Celebrations, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/opinion/2020/02/18/dont-forget-clarence-thomas-black-history-month-celebrations-column
/4741218002/ [https://perma.cc/A8KV-VPU8]; Casey, supra note 8.
12. Corey Robin is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College.
13 . The Enigma of Clarence Thomas, MACMILLAN PUBLISHERS, https://us.macmillan
.com/books/9781627793834 [https://perma.cc/Y5FA-R8Z7].
14. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885 (2016).
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the current moment, it is also tangible and real. Robin, a prolific public writer and editor of the socialist magazine Jacobin, is no ideological companion
of Thomas, which he makes clear at the outset (p. 15). Nevertheless, his efforts to take Thomas’s jurisprudence seriously, on its own terms, is an important template for real intellectual engagement.
Notwithstanding the admirable intrepidity of Enigma, it is replete with
substantive and normative challenges. The book illustrates the problem of
racial revisionism, which might be understood as the obscuring of race and
racial subordination by refining terms. 15 Substantively, the book obfuscates
racial inequality by imputing an underdeveloped and unrecognizable Black
nationalism to Justice Thomas. Despite the jurist’s rejection of the designation and some of its tenets, Robin insists on assigning the label to him. Robin
implausibly argues that Thomas, a Black nationalist, retains a constitutional
belief system that leads the jurist to conclude that carceral discipline is necessary to “re-create the conditions that made for black survival” (p. 191).
Thomas, per Robin’s logic, finds “black freedom possible through the instruments of policing, punishment, and prison” (p. 192).
This interpretation of Black nationalism presented in Enigma is historically unfamiliar, ideologically bizarre, and politically dangerous irrespective
of whether Thomas actually holds these beliefs. If Thomas does not hold
these beliefs, then Enigma obscures the discourse on racial justice by shoehorning Black nationalism into a carceral politics based on some premise of
benevolence. This diverts attention away from more likely sources of his judicial philosophy that many have argued produce racially disparate outcomes (e.g., law-and-order commitments or limited understandings of
constitutional protections).
If Thomas indeed holds the view that Black people need carceral discipline in order to achieve “freedom” (p. 192), and understands this as a legitimate Black nationalist position, then there are normative questions that go
unanswered and further obscure how to think about racial justice in the contemporary moment. Read this way, Robin is right and is simply the bearer of
bad news. But discerning readers can disaggregate Justice Thomas’s views—
which many would understand as objectionable—from Enigma’s failure to
offer meaningful enlightenment on what the public should do with said
views. At a time when multiracial social movements are challenging the expansive scope of our criminal legal system, what are they supposed to do
with this position? Assuming Robin is right, the earnest attempt to explain
Justice Thomas’s legal vision ultimately rehabilitates a destructive jurisprudence by rooting it in Black empowerment.
Underlying all of this is a lack of engagement with the scholarship on
Black nationalism and race-specific takes on Justice Thomas. These litera-

15 . See Darryl G. Barthé, Jr., Racial Revisionism, Caste Revisited: Whiteness, Blackness,
and Barack Obama, in OBAMA AND THE BIRACIAL FACTOR: THE BATTLE FOR A NEW
AMERICAN MAJORITY 81, 82 (Andrew J. Jolivette ed., 2012) (noting that racial revisionism “obscure[s] the realities of racism through a redefining of terms”).
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tures may have better informed parts of Enigma and mooted other aspects of
the book. The claim of underengagement could be easily levied against much
scholarly work, let alone public writing for broader audiences. But this version is troublesome because it offers a simplified analysis of racial politics
(an issue the general public overestimates its understanding of) and does not
wrestle with potentially clarifying issues that other scholars have addressed.
This shortcoming is tragic because Enigma is animated by racial justice concerns and demonstrates a keen understanding of America’s dreadful history
of racial subjugation at many points in the book. Ultimately, the book’s
shortcomings are likely to dull its insights for serious readers of race and the
law. More drastically, the book has the potential to dangerously confuse general readers who find the arguments ideologically attractive but do not have
the legal acumen to evaluate the claims or are simply underread on issues related to race.
The remaining parts of this Review employ the spirit of serious engagement that Enigma brings to Justice Thomas’s life and body of work. Part I
provides a synopsis of the book. Part II offers a critical assessment of the
project. Part III offers a short discussion on racial revisionism and the need
for more scholarly care when it comes to literature on race for the general
public.
I.

SYNOPSIS

Enigma is organized in three parts that correspond with three themes
that the author argues are “central elements of [Thomas’s] jurisprudence”:
race, capitalism, and the constitution (p. 14). The aim of the book, Robin explains, “is to make the invisible justice visible, drawing on the facts of Thomas’s biography to see how that biography, and the beliefs and ideologies that
developed with it, have found their way into his opinions, structuring and
informing his jurisprudence” (p. 11). Those three themes end up offering a
window into a variety of legal issues that include, but are not limited to, voting rights, federalism, the Commerce Clause, freedom of speech, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the right to bear arms, and the criminal justice
system (p. 11). Robin makes it clear that he rejects “virtually all of Thomas’s
views” and believes that the jurist lied to the Judiciary Committee when he
stated that he never sexually harassed Anita Hill (pp. 15, 163). At various
points in the book Robin also highlights some of the contradictions of Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence. But he informs the reader that his analysis is animated by “interpretation and analysis rather than objection and critique”
(p. 15). Accordingly, the book hews to this interpretive position and avoids
available critiques.
A. Race
The first part, “Race,” consists of three chapters titled “Race Man,”
“Stigmas,” and “Separate but Equal.” In these three chapters, Robin walks the
reader through Justice Thomas’s upbringing in Georgia to his role on the
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bench as an advocate for a specific brand of race jurisprudence. Thomas’s
three-year tenure at College of the Holy Cross, where he graduated ninth in
a class of 521, is integral to this account (p. 33). In the three years he spent
there, 1968 to 1971, he imbibed the Black Power ideology that was popular
on college campuses. 16 In addition to disavowing interracial sex and marriage (a position he held until meeting his current wife in 1986), he served as
secretary-treasurer of the Black Student Union (BSU) (pp. 26–27). Robin recalls a playful story where one member breached parts of the organization’s
eleven-part manifesto that disapproved of dating white women. 17 After a
mock trial where the offending member was found guilty, his Afro comb was
broken as a punishment (p. 27).
But Thomas took Black politics seriously; Robin describes how Thomas
had Malcolm X’s poster in his dorm room, loudly emphasized liberation for
the Black man, and in conjunction with BSU, organized a breakfast program
for poor children modeled after the Black Panthers (pp. 28–30). Things began to change when Thomas was confronted with white liberal snobbery and
constant questioning of his credentials at Yale Law School (p. 33). It was
there, Robin argues, that Thomas learned an unshakeable racial lesson:
“Whites—southern and northern, liberal and conservative, rural and urban—are racists” (p. 34). Like many Black attorneys before him, Thomas
suffered from a form of racial abuse and struggled to get the job he desired.
Ultimately, he went on to work for Missouri Attorney General John
Danforth and subsequently entered the federal government (p. 83). In Robin’s telling, Thomas’s experience at Yale and thereafter confirmed that racism was never going anywhere.
Race and stigma are powerfully tied for Justice Thomas in Enigma. Robin contends that the Court’s only Black jurist believes that “the most pervasive and toxic expression of race” as well as “the most grievous and direct
form of racism” is the “marking of individuals by the color of their skin in
ways that diminish or deny their personal talents, capacities, skills, and
strengths” (p. 54). Under his view, all mentions of race do not equate to racial stigma, but “every time the government places citizens on racial registers
and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans
us all.” 18

16. MARTHA BIONDI, THE BLACK REVOLUTION ON CAMPUS (2012); IBRAM X. KENDI,
THE BLACK CAMPUS MOVEMENT: BLACK STUDENTS AND THE RACIAL RECONSTITUTION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, 1965–1972 (2012).
17. The relevant sections are: “1. The Black man must respect the Black woman. The
Black man’s woman is the most beautiful of all women. . . . 9. The Black man does not want or
need the white woman. The Black man’s history shows that the white woman is the cause of his
failure to be the true Black man.” P. 27.
18. P. 59 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
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Justice Thomas’s famous dissent in Grutter v . Bollinger illustrates his
concerns around race and stigma. 19 In Grutter, the Court ruled that the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in its admission process was constitutional. 20 In a meaty opinion, Justice Thomas essentially
called the program a sham that was focused on racial aesthetics and protection of its elite status. 21 He maintained that if the Law School was genuinely
interested in diversity, it would reconsider its reliance on a standardized testing regime that produced racially skewed results. 22 In Robin’s account,
Thomas believes affirmative action is like Jim Crow and premised on a racial
paternalism that elevates whites as providers of scarce privileges to disempowered Blacks (pp. 63, 67). For Thomas,
[a]ffirmative action . . . is not only the product of liberals being unwilling to confront
their own elitism; it is also a symptom of their desire to display that elitism through acts
of beneficence to the less fortunate—acts that will not jeopardize their privilege, and the
stigma of which will be borne by African Americans. (p. 72)

Robin ties Justice Thomas’s suspicion of diversity to his skepticism of integration—noting two cases where the jurist questioned the presumed inferiority of Black institutions and praised their efforts. 23 After the first three
chapters, the reader is left with a portrait of a justice whose “conservative
black nationalism” considers integration as the “real harm to black people”
and understands “the separation of the races” as the condition for “black
flourishing” (p. 76).
B. Capitalism
The three chapters in “Capitalism” focus on Thomas’s tenure in the
EEOC and his judicial opinions on political-economy issues. Chapter Four,
“White State, Black Market,” explains how Thomas absorbed himself in the
work of Black economist Thomas Sowell while working in Missouri after law
school. Sowell’s book, Race and Economics, which Robin describes as a mix
of Malcolm X and Milton Friedman, heavily influenced Thomas and pushed
him to the right “without forsaking the race consciousness he had forged on
the left” (p. 84–85). But Thomas’s understanding of the left’s shortcomings
in the 1970s hardened his views about the state’s inability to remedy social
inequality, particularly for Black people (pp. 93–95). Economics would become more of a priority than racial politics. Thomas felt that African Ameri-

19. For takes on Grutter and explications of Justice Thomas’s position on diversity, see
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425 (2014); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1622 (2003).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
21 . See id . at 356–57 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22 . Id . at 369–70.
23. Pp. 76–79 (discussing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) and United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992)).
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cans “should abandon protest in the streets and the pursuit of political power
in favor of economic visions of development” (p. 97). The lessons from his
grandfather—an entrepreneur who raised him in Georgia and emphasized
self-sufficiency—would become more prominent (p. 98).
Chapter Five, “Against Politics,” continues the theme of economic primacy, but the claims become more peculiar. Robin begins by stating that
“[t]he goal of Thomas’s conservative black nationalist jurisprudence is to
limit the involvement of black people with the white state, to persuade black
people to give up their illusion that politics can positively affect their condition and perhaps to abandon politics altogether.” 24 Two decisions are central
to this argument. The first, Holder v . Hall, was a voter-dilution case brought
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 25 That case involved a
Georgia county where whites were the overwhelming majority, and a single
elected county commissioner held all the legislative and executive power. 26
Blacks were consistently outvoted, and they argued that this system limited
their political influence and diluted their vote. 27 They desired a five-person
commission that might allow them to elect a representative, but the Court
upheld the single-commission practice and concluded that no standard
could be used to establish the appropriate number of commissioners. 28 Justice Thomas’s lengthy concurrence rejected the idea of a Black voting bloc
and argued that voting-dilution cases were not subject to judicial review. 29
Robin reads Thomas as believing that it is a “terrible illusion” for African
Americans to believe they can exercise power in the political realm (p. 108).
The other decision that undergirds Robin’s economic-primacy argument is Kelo v . City of New London, which involved a government-takings
claim brought by property owners whose land was condemned by a city hoping to complete a redevelopment project. 30 The Court upheld the taking, and
in a lone dissent, Justice Thomas tethered the taking to urban renewal of the
1950s and 1960s (p. 116). He engaged in what Robin describes as a “sustained polemic against eminent domain as a tool of racial oppression”
(p. 116). Pointing directly to Justice Thomas’s evocation of Carolene Products’s “Footnote 4” and the protection of insular minorities, 31 Robin maintains that the justice was trying to invert the script and argue that if the
Court cared about minorities it would scrutinize economic legislation

24. P. 105. This is accomplished, Robin argues, by (1) deemphasizing and diminishing
the power of voting; (2) demonstrating the state’s inability to improve the lives of Blacks (and
in some instances its active undermining of them); and (3) depriving the state of the legislative
and regulatory tools that would intervene in the lives of Blacks. P. 106.
25. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
26 . Holder, 512 U.S. at 889.
27 . Id .
28 . Id .
29 . See id . at 903 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
31. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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(p. 117). The chapter is rounded out by a discussion of Justice Thomas’s narrow and much debated view of the Commerce Clause 32 as expressed in cases
such as United States v . Lopez 33 and Gonzales v . Raich. 34 Justice Thomas’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, per Robin’s account, is interested in limiting the expansive scope Congress has in its involvement of people’s affairs
(p. 124). This continues the theme of politics being a distraction from economics in Thomas’s vision.
Whether it is by design, because of complexity, or lack of focus, the
Black nationalist argument recedes to the background of the chapters on
capitalism, particularly in the last installment, “Men of Money.” This chapter
focuses on Thomas’s expansive understandings of commercial speech and
support for the loosening of campaign finance laws via the First Amendment. Robin acknowledges that Thomas’s decisions in this area “make no
explicit mention of race” (p. 131). Instead, Fredrich Hayek, one of Thomas’s
significant influences, gets attention. Hayek argued that money is not only
an instrument that allows for the pursuit of one’s interest but also how people express their values and beliefs (p. 132). Accordingly, Thomas “defends
the rights of the wealthy to donate unlimited sums to their favored candidates” and believes that economic-related speech—whether advertising or
donations— deserves the same protections that literary and political speech
receive (pp. 129–30). What emerges from these middle chapters is the portrait of a jurist who protects plutocracy so that rich people can economically
assert political influence and insists that Black people are better served by retreating from the electoral domain and focusing on wealth accumulation and
economic empowerment.
C. Constitution
The last Part, “Constitution,” examines the development of Justice
Thomas’s political thinking and zooms in on his time in the Reagan Administration. During this period Thomas developed what Robin describes as a
“Black Constitution” and a “White Constitution.” The Black Constitution
recognizes the violent, racist, and regressive nature of American society and
has the individual’s right to bear arms at its center (pp. 169–70). That individual is the authoritative Black man, who provides for his family, and wields
his gun “to guard his family from marauding white supremacists” (p. 153).
The Court’s gutting of constitutional protections in the late nineteenth century provides more context for this Black Constitution. Most importantly,
the Slaughter-House Cases ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did
not apply to states and essentially left the issues of rights and liberties to their
32 . Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (supporting Justice Thomas’s view), with Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant
S. Nelson, Essay, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 695 (2002) (rejecting it).
33. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
34. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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discretion. 35 Three years later, the Court limited federal oversight of civil
rights by ruling that the Second Amendment also did not apply to states. 36
The Civil Rights Cases would rule that the Equal Protection Clause applied to
government and not private actors, 37 and Plessy v . Ferguson would dull this
provision further by approving state discrimination with the notorious trope
of “separate but equal.” 38
Whereas the mid-twentieth-century Court would restore the Equal Protection Clause and deploy the Due Process Clause to protect Blacks from a
racist criminal justice system, Thomas believes the Privileges or Immunities
Clause should be revived instead (pp. 173–74). This belief, Robin explains, is
best illustrated by Justice Thomas’s opinion in McDonald v . City of Chicago. 39 While the Court used the Due Process Clause to incorporate the Second
Amendment against the states, Thomas believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was a better constitutional route toward that goal (p. 178).
Thomas’s concurrence, which no other justice joined, focused heavily on
Black violence and gun ownership, which Robin argues “are central both to
the making of freedom and to its unmaking” (p. 179). But this masculinistempowering vision of a Black Constitution is only half of the story.
The last substantive chapter culminates with a discussion of Thomas’s
“White Constitution.” Whereas “the black man” in the Black Constitution is
a protective patriarch, in the White Constitution, he is “an absent figure,
abandoning his family for the pleasures of drugs, crime, and sex, leaving his
children in the care of weak-willed black women who cannot supply the authority children need to grow up into the sturdy, proud folk their ancestors
once were” (p. 153). Robin also notes the lack of accommodations for Black
women in Justice Thomas’s bifurcated constitutional world (p. 164). They
are either “victims of black male criminals and ne’er-do-wells empowered by
the rights revolution to abandon their responsibilities,” or “like his mother
or sister, treacherous sources of dependency and dissolution” (p. 164). Accordingly, this White Constitution is premised on the idea that Black people
need the disciplining force of law to arrive at personal development and
freedom. Black people need tension in this vision of legal ordering, but liberalism’s emphasis on selfhood and disinterest in punishment limits the exigency Black people need to thrive (p. 189–90).
The chapter explains Justice Thomas’s nostalgia for the world of racial
struggle that predated the Civil Rights Movement. In Robin’s rendering, Justice Thomas believes that Black people “need to go back to the years of their
greatest degradation and despair and to retrieve from that darkness the habits and virtues that enabled their ancestors to survive” (p. 191). The penal
state, which is central to Thomas’s White Constitution, supplies the condi35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

P. 172; 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
P. 173; 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
P. 173; 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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tions for Black survival (p. 191). Put simply and harrowingly, the White
Constitution “makes black freedom possible through the instruments of policing, punishment, and prison” (p. 192). Policing serves as the “structuring
force that helps African Americans organize” and “even improve” their lives
(p. 206). Robin argues that Justice Thomas does not meaningfully confront
the reality of racism in the criminal justice system but suggests that, notwithstanding such racism, it serves a deterrent function: “[I]t provides African
Americans with every reason they need to steer clear of trouble” (p. 201–02).
The author explores this perspective by providing the reader with a glimpse
of Justice Thomas’s decisions in cases involving prison conditions, the death
penalty, unreasonable searches and seizures, and an anti-loitering gang ordinance.
After the substantive chapters of the book, the reader is left with a raceconscious jurist who prioritizes economic freedom for Blacks over political
empowerment and holds unique views about how the Constitution should
govern the lives of that community. The book’s epilogue concludes with a
solemn recognition of Justice Thomas’s bizarrely mixed jurisprudence. It
notes that some of Thomas’s beliefs are widely shared in American society—
specifically the ideas that race is permanent, that politics cannot overcome
despair, and that state action is ineffective (p. 221). “Perhaps that explains
Thomas’s enigmatic silence on the bench,” Robin explains (p. 221). He adds,
“What need is there to speak when the rest of us are saying his words?”
(p. 221).
II.

BLACK NATIONALISM ILL-ENGAGED

Enigma has received much laudatory attention in the press, particularly
by journalists. 40 Scholars and writers have provided varied criticism. Professor Kenneth Mack identifies the methodological problem of focusing on Supreme Court cases and writes, “judicial opinion-writing is hardly a
transparent vehicle for the explication of a judge’s social philosophy.” 41
Moreover, “if Thomas has a philosophy,” Mack writes, “black nationalism is
an odd name for it.” 42 Professor Randall Kennedy questions the solicitude
Robin offers the jurist in the book. Kennedy maintains that “Robin mostly
accepts at face value Thomas’s portrayal of himself as a race man deeply in40 . See, e .g ., Jennifer Szalai, ‘The Enigma of Clarence Thomas’ Makes a Strong Case for
Its Provocative Thesis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23
/books/review-enigma-clarence-thomas-corey-robin.html
[https://perma.cc/7AT4-XUZQ];
John W.W. Zeiser, “A Mix of Malcolm and Milton”: On Corey Robin’s “The Enigma of Clarence
Thomas,” L.A. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 30, 2019), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/a-mix-ofmalcolm-and-milton-on-corey-robins-the-enigma-of-clarence-thomas/
[https://perma.cc
/H87D-ZELV].
41. Kenneth W. Mack, The Contradictory Conservatism of Clarence Thomas, WASH.
POST (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-contradictoryconservatism-of-clarence-thomas/2019/09/26/05ad97a4-d325-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abd_story
.html [https://perma.cc/BU22-SYAL].
42 . Id .
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vested in black America” and “falls victim to a talented con artist who, over
the course of his long career, has seduced and traduced.” 43 Professor Melissa
Murray has noted the relative absence of Black women in Robin’s account
and the inattention to reproductive rights. 44 Myron Magnet, editor-at-large
of City Journal and author of a book about Justice Thomas released around
the same time as Enigma, offers a more biting assessment from the right. 45
He believes Justice Thomas would “dismiss Robin’s conclusion that the civil
rights movement failed” and maintains that “Thomas does not think that
slavery and Jim Crow were any kind of boon to black Americans.” 46
The remaining portions of this Review extend these analyses by delving
more deeply into Enigma’s claims about Black nationalism while breaking
away from what have been mostly uncritical, liberal, and journalistic appraisals of the book. The most striking issues with Enigma are its treatments
of previous scholarship and Black nationalism. These issues overlap, but they
are also distinct. Section II.A considers Enigma’s treatment of previous
scholarship that has focused precisely on the issues of race, Black nationalism, and Justice Thomas. Some important works are overlooked entirely;
others are acknowledged but underengaged despite raising issues that speak
directly to the book’s claims. Section II.B widens the critique to a broader
discussion about the book’s lack of engagement with scholarship about Black
nationalism—which spans disciplines and fields including history, political
science, Africana studies, and critical race studies. The version of Black nationalism Enigma concludes with would be unfamiliar to people who work
in this scholarly tradition and invites doubt into the accuracy of the book’s
central thesis.
A. Due Deference and Thin Engagements
Robin unevenly engages previous writings about Justice Thomas in ways
that may lead the untrained reader to believe that there is more novelty to
Enigma than is the case. Consequently, some of Robin’s claims are unremarkable, while others are undermined or underdeveloped. Consider a few
examples.
Writing a few years after Justice Thomas was confirmed, Catharine
Pierce Wells, who is not a scholar of race but wrote thoughtfully about the
justice, recognized many of the themes in Enigma without affixing the “black
nationalist” label. Professor Wells explained Thomas’s racialized distrust of

43. Randall Kennedy, The Apparatchik, NATION (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.thenation
.com/article/archive/enigma-clarence-thomas-book-review (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
44. Melissa Murray, Foiling Clarence Thomas, HOUSE DIVIDED (Jan. 28, 2020), https://
www.ahousedividedapd.com/2020/01/28/foiling-clarence-thomas
[https://perma.cc/575KH64W].
45. MYRON MAGNET, CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2019).
46. Myron Magnet, Misjudging Clarence Thomas, CITY J. (Sept. 29, 2019),
https://www.city-journal.org/the-enigma-of-clarence-thomas [https://perma.cc/87NF-895W].

April 2021]

Racial Revisionism

1177

government and preference for self-help as well as the overlap between conservative values and the Black community. 47 Her comments on the latter are
worth quoting at length:
Republican thinking . . . emphasizes a number of themes that resonate with
Black experience. For example, the Black community includes many religious organizations—both Muslim and Christian—that preach selfreliance, family values, and strong deterrence of criminal activity. It also includes political organizations that promote racial separatism and economic
self-sufficiency. Ideologically, these organizations have more in common
with the Republican emphasis on Black capitalism than they do with the
liberal program of integration and affirmative action. Thus, within the
Black community, Thomas’ conservatism is a familiar theme as millions of
African Americans have adopted hard work and high moral standards as
their response to racism. 48

This observation normalizes some of the conservative positions that Justice Thomas holds and makes some of the claims about Thomas less foreign.
Yet Enigma makes a spectacle out of a set of positions that are familiar to
Black people.
Enigma also missed out on opportunities to engage scholarship that
could have shored up its thesis. The book identifies the relationship between
Thomas’s ostensible resistance to integration and support for Black institutions. Scholars who made that early connection are not consulted. Eleanor
Brown, writing twenty years ago in the NYU Law Review, commented on
how the “dissatisfaction with the integrative ideal has come from various
sources within the black community” and noted that “this disenchantment
has been most prominently articulated by Justice Clarence Thomas.” 49 Professor Brown proceeded to link Justice Thomas’s rejection of integration
with Black nationalist–styled, Afrocentric secondary education programs. 50
Robin’s lack of engagement with this piece (which actually supports part of
his argument) results in a lost opportunity to go beyond the surface level of
recognizing connections and press deeper into the stakes of Justice Thomas’s
anti-integration impulses.
Existing scholarship, if Engima consulted it, would also have allowed the
book to raise essential questions about Thomas’s view of Black empower-

47. Catharine Pierce Wells, Essay, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 117, 133, 140 (1993) (“Thomas’ conservatism is based upon a simple conclusion drawn
from this experience: Do not, under any circumstances, trust government to improve the situation of Black people. For Thomas, it was clear that the hard work and determined efforts of
Black people would never find their natural reward until racist white governments were confined to the bare essentials.” (footnote omitted)).
48 . Id . at 140.
49. Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? “Gangsta” Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 315 (2000).
50 . Id . at 319; see also ALGERNON AUSTIN, ACHIEVING BLACKNESS: RACE, BLACK
NATIONALISM, AND AFROCENTRISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 170 (2006) (describing Afrocentrism as an integrationist Black nationalism).
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ment. Writing between the analyses offered by Professors Wells and Brown,
Dorothy Roberts discussed Justice Thomas’s “separatist leanings” in the Yale
Law Journal. 51 One wonders how Enigma would have handled Professor
Roberts’s observation that Justice Thomas espoused the kind of Black separatism that fails to confront white supremacy or upset current power arrangements and ultimately becomes “quite acceptable to whites.” 52 If
Professor Roberts is right, is Justice Thomas’s purported version of Black nationalist conservatism that exceptional or newsworthy? If she is wrong, how
does Justice Thomas’s vision upset or challenge the racial order? A reader
committed to the wellbeing of Black people will search Enigma for Justice
Thomas’s answers to these questions and find none. And Enigma’s oversights pose real risks for disinterested or distanced readers: for them, the
question of maintaining racial order would go unnoticed because of Enigma’s failure to seriously engage scholars who have written thoughtfully
about Justice Thomas.
There are previous examinations of Justice Thomas’s opinions that do
get cited but are not afforded enough room to breathe in Enigma. Most of
these insights are relegated to simple, back-of-the-book citations. A few have
the fortune of getting some explanatory exposition in the footnotes. Of
course, space limitations allow for discussion of only a handful. 2004 is crucial here: that year, Kendall Thomas and Mark Tushnet attempted to explain
how nationalism fits into Justice Thomas’s legal thinking, but these important works are undertheorized by Enigma. 53
Professor Tushnet’s analysis was arguably an explicit articulation of Justice Thomas’s Black nationalism. His unambiguously titled article, Clarence
Thomas’s Black Nationalism, was written for the Howard Law Journal for a
fifty-year commemoration of Brown. In those pages he wrote, “Thomas is
only the most recent representative of a distinguished tradition of Black nationalism in its conservative variant.” 54 Enigma cites Professor Tushnet and
draws on his primary argument. However, the book does not grapple with
an important point Professor Tushnet makes that is central to Black nationalism in the pages of Enigma. Portending Robin’s claim that Thomas believes
Black people must look internally at their own institutions, Tushnet writes
that “black nationalism cannot be defended as a choice when the institutions
involved are not black by choice.” 55 In those specific circumstances, Tushnet
argues, “black nationalism must be understood as a way for people to make
the best of a bad situation.” 56 At best, Robin does not contextualize the situa-

51. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J.
1563, 1600 (1996) (book review).
52 . Id .
53 . See Kendall Thomas, Essay, Reading Clarence Thomas, 18 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 224
(2004); Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas’s Black Nationalism, 47 HOW. L.J. 323 (2004).
54. Tushnet, supra note 53, at 339.
55 . Id . at 337.
56 . Id .
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tional nature of Black nationalism, specifically as it relates to Black institutions. At worse, Robin does not address a crucial condition that affects his
argument.
Professor Kendall Thomas’s contributions are subtler but no less powerful; Robin acknowledges his work (p. 163) but misses some of his crucial insights. Professor Thomas describes Justice Thomas’s “black neo-conservative
cultural nationalism.” 57 He also suggests that Justice Thomas’s appeal to racial identity, whether in Court conferences or in his opinions, worked as a
“valuable weapon in the right-wing campaign to reconfigure the constitutional politics of race and reestablish the racial state on a new cultural and
ideological foundation.” 58 Part of that project, Professor Thomas contends,
“is not to abolish the color line, but to redraw it.” 59 Read in this way, Justice
Thomas’s legal worldview, as rendered in Enigma, may not necessarily be
unique, but it is a way of reordering “the fragile political settlement reached
during the civil rights years.” 60 Such a reordering limits race as a category of
constitutional significance or remediation. Recognition of and engagement
with this contention might have tempered some of the claims made in Enigma, nudged toward deeper analysis, or provided more fodder for prescriptive insights into how to think about Justice Thomas’s role in our legal
system.
One could go on with the list of scholars cited in Enigma whose ideas
merit more space than was given. Manning Marable’s analysis of Black nationalism in the Thomas confirmation is discussed. But Professor Marable
also argued that Justice Thomas is a neo-accomodationist conservative who
was unmoored from Black resistance politics and deployed race for career
purposes (p. 8). This argument is not confronted. Following Marable’s reading (and the lineage of Black nationalists Enigma links him to), one might
query whether it is politically possible for a figure of Thomas’s stature to be a
Black nationalist yet unconnected to any identifiable Black nationalist organizations or organizing. Professor Stephen Smith, who served as one of Justice
Thomas’s first clerks on the Court, and Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig have
covered some of Enigma’s ground. 61 They raise thoughtful questions about
the dynamism of racial identity that, if wrestled with, might have mooted

57. Thomas, supra note 53, at 235.
58 . Id . at 237.
59 . Id .
60 . Id . at 238.
61. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931, 965 (2005)
(“[T]he mere existence of Clarence Thomas, one of the most prominent members of the Black
Right, reflects exactly how a person who strongly identifies as a Black can cultivate values and
beliefs in ways that differ from the vast majority of members in his or her racial group.”); Stephen F. Smith, Clarence X?: The Black Nationalist Behind Justice Thomas’s Constitutionalism, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 583, 625 (2009) (“Indeed, there may not be any one ‘right’ answer on an
issue as complex as how best to advance the interests of a race comprised of tens of millions of
people.”).
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some of the criticism that follows. Professor Guy-Uriel Charles has described
the “epistemic authority” Justice Thomas commands on the Court as its only
Black member. 62 Enigma cites but does not engage this key feature of Professor Charles’s article, which could have supplied more normative insights on
how to think about the role that Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence has on the
Court (p. 9). Crucially, the issue I am pointing out is not of scholarly box
checking or legal turf defending. Robin’s underengagement leads to overstated claims of novelty, precludes harder questions from being asked and
answered in the book, and offers a representation of Black politics that does
not approximate its complexity.
B. Whose Black Nationalism?
Despite being one of the core ideological features of Enigma, Black nationalism is inadequately defined due to the book’s failure to deeply employ
the well-established interdisciplinary literature on the topic. Enigma only
provides a few paragraphs on this multicentury, multivalent ideological outlook. Black nationalism is a prominent theme in Africana studies—
ironically, the field that Justice Thomas affirmatively encouraged a Black
high school mentee to avoid. 63 Deep treatments of Black nationalism also
span the social sciences and the humanities and include texts in history, literature, and political science. 64 Enigma’s interdisciplinarity bends toward
62. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph
of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575 (2005).
63. Thomas mentored a Black high school student in D.C. and the summer before his
enrollment at Brown told him:
No doubt one thing you’ll find when you get to a school like Brown is a lot of classes
and orientation on race relations. Try to avoid them. Try to say to yourself, ‘I’m not a
black person, I’m just a person.’ You’ll find a lot of so called multicultural combat, a lot
of struggle between ethnic and racial groups, and people wanting you to sign on, to narrow yourself into some group identity or other. You have to resist that, Cedric. You understand?

Thomas proceeded to ask the student what he would be majoring in and he responded math.
The jurist replied:
Good. Good. That’s what I look for in hiring my clerks—the cream of the crop—I look
for the maths and the sciences, real classes, none of that Afro-American-studies stuff. If
they’ve taken that stuff as an undergraduate, I don’t want them. You want to do that, do
it in your spare time.

See Ron Suskind, And Clarence Thomas Wept, ESQUIRE, July 1998, at 70, 73. This is also discussed in Brown, supra note 49, at 319 n.32.
64. Some particular texts that may have provided historical, theoretical, and empirical
insights into Robin’s project include RUSSELL RICKFORD, WE ARE AN AFRICAN PEOPLE:
INDEPENDENT EDUCATION, BLACK POWER, AND THE RADICAL IMAGINATION (2016); MELANYE
T. PRICE, DREAMING BLACKNESS: BLACK NATIONALISM AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PUBLIC
OPINION (2009); ROD BUSH, WE ARE NOT WHAT WE SEEM: BLACK NATIONALISM AND CLASS
STRUGGLE IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1999); WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, NEW DAY IN
BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965–1975 (1992);
ALPHONSO PINKNEY, RED, BLACK, AND GREEN: BLACK NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
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law but not this scholarship. Black nationalism deserves more independent
attention in the book not because it is a worthwhile perspective (although I
believe that to be so) but because it is a core feature of Robin’s story. It is
central to the Black nationalist conservatism Robin centers the project
around. Except for some pat references to the multidimensionality of Black
nationalism and the fact that Black people have drawn on different strands of
this idea, readers are not forced to grapple with the depth of the concept
(pp. 5–7, 31–32). Instead, readers get Black nationalism through the lens of
Justice Thomas. This authorially mediated version of Black nationalism is
not bankrupt, especially considering Robin’s deep traversals into crevices of
Thomas’s jurisprudence. But the absence of a robust rendering of Black nationalism means that the reader cannot meaningfully assess the veracity of
Justice Thomas’s putative Black nationalist conservatism. Enigma grapples
more thoroughly with other inputs—conservatism, constitutional clauses,
life history—but Black nationalism gets short shrift.
The most explicit articulation of Black nationalism comes in the early
pages of the book when Robin notes that Justice Thomas’s Black nationalism
is selective (p. 6). Justice Thomas, he argues, rejects the Third World internationalism and revolutionary rhetoric of Black nationalism (pp. 5–6). The
aspects of Black nationalism that are central to Thomas’s jurisprudence, the
author notes, are “the celebration of black self-sufficiency, the scathing attack on integration, the support for racial separatism and black institutions,
the emphasis on black manhood as the pathway to black freedom, the reverence for black self-defense” (p. 6).
There are some threshold questions worth considering before diving into issues. First, how does one square Robin’s (and others’) description of
Thomas as a Black nationalist with Thomas’s rejection of the term? In a 1987
interview with Reason, Thomas was asked plainly if he was a Black nationalist, to which he responded, “I’m not a nationalist.” 65 That is not dispositive
but calls for explication. Robin describes this “downplay[ing]” and notes that
Thomas has “never disavowed its role in his development” (p. 32). That may
be right, but it gestures toward different claims: that either Thomas was a
Black nationalist or that he has been influenced by Black nationalism. Neither of these necessarily mean Justice Thomas is a Black nationalist. As a
scandal involving one of Justice Thomas’s famous Yale Law School classmates highlighted, “is” is an operative word. 66

(1976); Daryl Michael Scott, How Black Nationalism Became Sui Generis, FIRE!!!, Summer/Winter 2012, at 6; Ray Block Jr., What About Disillusionment? Exploring the Pathways to
Black Nationalism, 33 POL. BEHAV. 27 (2011).
65. Bill Kauffman, Freedom Now II: Interview with Clarence Thomas, REASON (Nov.
1987), https://reason.com/1987/11/01/clarence-thomas/ [https://perma.cc/CR3H-KC4S].
66 . See Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is,” SLATE (Sept. 13, 1998, 9:14
PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/1998/09/bill-clinton-and-the-meaning-of-is.html
[https://perma.cc/Y7MT-ZSMJ] (discussing Bill Clinton’s testimony to a grand jury regarding
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky and the controversy regarding the precise meaning of
the word is). Conceptually, Robin’s argument might be particularized into three kinds of
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Similarly, Robin does not explore the tensions between Thomas’s professed views on separatism and the views Robin attributes to him. Discussing
Thomas’s shift from the tenets of Malcolm X and the Black Panther Party to
the right, Robin argues that “Thomas has never lost touch with the racial
separatism of his early encounters” (pp. 2–3). How is this reconciled with
Thomas’s own claim that he “never went along with the militant separatism
of the Black Muslims” but admired their emphasis on self-determination? 67
Ultimately, what a reader is left with is Thomas’s rejection of Black nationalism and its separatism on one hand and Robin’s insistence of their presence
in his legal thinking on the other. One is left to wonder: What is the value of
imposing a set of politics on a person who rejects them? Why the adamance
about categorizing a person as something he says he is not? Analytically, this
categorization quandary prompts inquiry into the tensions between selfidentification (“I am x”), imposed categories (“you are x”), and group consciousness (“we define ourselves as x”). This identification problem is larger
than Enigma’s objective but one Robin must confront to advance his bold
claims.
Robin also does not dig deeply into Thomas’s rejection of Black nationalism’s internationalist component. For people who study Black nationalism
or adhere to its tenets, this is not a meaningless excision. The Black nationalist thinkers that Robin argues influenced Thomas imagined themselves as
part of a larger African diaspora. 68 Marcus Garvey’s political project—
embodied most in the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA)—
began in Kingston, Jamaica, and was premised on the idea of pan-African
unity. 69 Stokely Carmichael, who makes a few appearances in Enigma, was
born in Trinidad and Tobago. 70 He made Africa central to his conception of
Black nationalism and insisted that “Black Nationalism is African Nationalism” and “[s]o too Black Power really means African Power.” 71 Discussing
Malcolm X, Robin notes that Thomas was “one of ‘Malcolm’s children.’ ” 72
Malcolm X’s parents were Garveyites, and after his split with the Nation of

claims that take conservatism as a given and really imagine Black nationalism as the main
event. The first is what he offers: that Justice Thomas is a Black nationalist. Robin also demonstrates how Justice Thomas was a Black nationalist, which is a simple issue of historical biography. Finally, there is a claim that straddles both: that there are traces of Black nationalist
residue in his jurisprudence (which might be a product of Justice Thomas’s current-day embodiment of Black nationalism or inspired by Justice Thomas’s previous forays with black nationalism). Though Robin argues the first, portions of the book often seem to reference the
latter two.
67. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 62 (2007).
68 . See, e .g ., pp. 26, 58, 105.
69 . See COLIN GRANT, NEGRO WITH A HAT: THE RISE AND FALL OF MARCUS GARVEY
AND HIS DREAM OF MOTHER AFRICA 54 (2008).
70. PENIEL E. JOSEPH, STOKELY: A LIFE 5 (2014).
71. STOKELY CARMICHAEL [KWAME TURE], STOKELY SPEAKS: FROM BLACK POWER TO
PAN-AFRICANISM 224 (Chi. Rev. Press 2007) (1971).
72. P. 26 (quoting BIONDI, supra note 16, at 2).
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Islam, he centered Africa and people of the diaspora in his politics. 73 Justice
Thomas may cull from aspects of Black nationalism as he sees fit (to the extent that he does). Suggesting otherwise would come dangerously close to
policing one’s political orientation or suggest that one can identify a perfect
version of Black nationalism (or politics more generally). But Thomas’s selectivity raises hard questions about what could even constitute a Black nationalist jurisprudence. Are Black immigrants who are not descendants of
Americans held in bondage, but are burdened by a racial caste system that
slavery created, included in Thomas’s legal vision? Are they something else
or collapsed into the category of Black? Enigma’s failure to interrogate
Thomas’s demographic understanding of Blackness understates the stakes of
writing about Black nationalism and undermines the project of comprehending his jurisprudence more fully.
It is important to note that I do not aim to offer a prototypical version of
Black nationalism or say that Justice Thomas is not a Black nationalist based
on a preferred definition. Instead, my contention is that Robin does not engage the breadth and depth of scholarship on Black nationalism. However, if
one accepts the book’s limited conceptualization of Black nationalism, strict
scrutiny would show that Justice Thomas’s supposed subscription to that
ideology is historically and sociologically unremarkable. Self-help and uplift
politics—not unique to Black nationalism—have long been espoused by elite
Blacks. 74 Widespread Black suspicion of whites has been subject to historical,
sociological, and anthropological examination. 75 Self-defense and Black affinity for guns are also not specific to Black nationalism; Black gun ownership has been overshadowed by narratives of racial violence against Blacks
and nonviolent political protest. 76 As Robin points out, Black nationalism’s
patriarchal emphasis on Black masculinity has been an obnoxious feature of
this ideology (p. 6), but it has also been a general feature of Black politics
notwithstanding Black women’s invaluable contributions to both. 77 To ap-

73 . See TUNDE ADELEKE, AFRICA IN BLACK LIBERATION ACTIVISM: MALCOLM X,
STOKELY CARMICHAEL AND WALTER RODNEY 32, 37 (2017).
74 . See generally KEVIN K. GAINES, UPLIFTING THE RACE: BLACK LEADERSHIP, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
75 . See, e .g ., SHAYLA C. NUNNALLY, TRUST IN BLACK AMERICA: RACE, DISCRIMINATION,
AND POLITICS (2012); JOHN L. JACKSON, JR., RACIAL PARANOIA: THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (2008); MIA BAY, THE WHITE IMAGE IN THE
BLACK MIND: AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT WHITE PEOPLE, 1830–1925 (2000).
76 . See, e .g ., NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF
ARMS (2014); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991).
77 . See, e .g ., KEISHA N. BLAIN, SET THE WORLD ON FIRE: BLACK NATIONALIST WOMEN
AND THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (2018); ULA YVETTE TAYLOR, THE PROMISE OF
PATRIARCHY: WOMEN AND THE NATION OF ISLAM (2017); NIKKI BROWN, PRIVATE POLITICS
AND PUBLIC VOICES: BLACK WOMEN’S ACTIVISM FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE NEW DEAL
(2006).
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preciate the plasticity of Robin’s Black nationalism, and its wide applicability, consider this: many of these features are found in hip-hop culture. 78
The most striking feature of the version of Black nationalism Robin ascribes to Thomas is its lack of consonance with the “Black” and “White”
Constitutions discussed in Part III of the book. Black nationalism certainly
changes across time. However, I’m fairly confident that the people Robin
traces Justice Thomas’s Black nationalist genealogy to would likely reject the
idea that Black people need to recreate the conditions of slavery and Jim
Crow—worlds that they endured and challenged—to conjure up some special racial resolve. In addition to rejecting the appellation of Black nationalist
(conservative), I suspect that Justice Thomas himself would reject this imposed vision, as would some of his supporters. Instead, law and order,
originalism, moral responsibility, and a limited vision of how the federal
government can remedy racial discrimination probably provide better clues
to his judicial politics than Black nationalism. Robin attempts to take Justice
Thomas seriously in many places and that effort shows. Nevertheless, a more
earnest approach would not have linked the jurist to a Black nationalist tradition that Thomas explicitly rejects and relevant scholarship suggests he is
not a devotee of.
III. RACIAL REVISIONISM
While Robin displays some deftness with his braiding of Thomas’s history, jurisprudence, and understanding of political economy, it is less clear
what readers are supposed to do with the book’s arguments, assuming they
believe the account offered in Enigma. The substantive chapters offer mostly
descriptive analysis. The three-page epilogue that serves as the conclusion
offers some keen insights on the antidemocratic nature of the Supreme
Court and the Electoral College but is otherwise thin.
Importantly, Robin is not a legal scholar per se. Normativity is something that legal academics are uniquely, though not exclusively, sensitive
to—some legal scholars believe their intellectual work should focus on truth
seeking; others insist that legal scholarship should aim at social betterment. 79
If Enigma is interested simply in ascertaining the truth, the analysis offered
in Part II of this Review has particular salience. If Robin has some prescriptive or normative drive to his project, I struggled deeply to understand what
purpose is served by a talented scholar of the right telling mainstream white
audiences that Justice Thomas has Black folks’ best interest in mind.
Assuming Robin is right, what does this mean for the Black people that
are seemingly at the center of Thomas’s juridical world? What should they
be doing with this information, if anything? What about white audiences?
People of other racial backgrounds? Ultimately, I must admit that my reac78 . See generally LAKEYTA M. BONNETTE, PULSE OF THE PEOPLE: POLITICAL RAP MUSIC
AND BLACK POLITICS (2015).
79. Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC.
6, 7 (2016).
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tion upon completing the book was not that different from Professor
Girardeau Spann’s response to the earliest iterations of Fisher v . University of
Texas: “whatever.” 80 That remark was not animated by dismissiveness of the
project: Enigma tees up some good questions, is replete with fascinating tidbits of information, and, again, is a quasi model for how to have an extended
scholarly engagement with ideas that are anathema to the author. But it is
the uncritical consumption of half-baked work on race, during a moment of
unique racial strife, that inspires some of the prescriptive questions in these
pages.
Enigma is stylized as a revisionist project, but it is closer to a kind of racial revisionism, which historian Darryl G. Barthé, Jr. has argued “obscure[s]
the realities of racism through a redefining of terms.” 81 The concept can be
widened and understood as the intentional or unintentional obscuring of racial subordination through the redefining of terms. The “terms” might be
actual words or phrases or might refer to terms in racial discourse. At the
most basic level, racial revisionism takes place via racial rhetoric that is
sometimes coded and, in other instances, explicit. Some of the many keywords include “all lives matter,” “colorblind,” “handout,” “model minority,”
and “war on cops.” 82 These words, and many others, do little to advance racial-justice imperatives.
But the more subtle form of racial revisionism, likely unintentional, is
exemplified by Enigma and is tied to the book’s understanding of Black nationalism and Black politics. The concern here is the potential confusion and
harm that might emanate from simplified renderings of Black politics under
the presumed guise of complication. On the left, the possible objections are
plentiful. If Justice Thomas is a Black nationalist and harbors the belief that
Black people need carceral discipline, then, by implication, this correctional
impulse might be understood as an appropriate ingredient of Black nationalism. Besides being ideologically bizarre, this belief, which again is premised
on the idea that Justice Thomas believes that police are a “structuring force”
that helps Black people “organize” and “improve,” might be uncritically consumed as a legitimate perspective. This is not to say that people will adopt
these politics as their own. But this Black-empowerment rationale for carceral subjugation—which Enigma brings into the public sphere precisely when
social movements are organizing against the penal state’s anti-Black violence—is deeply troubling and distracting. The response might be that
Enigma’s project is explicative. But even that endeavor could be read as dis-

80. Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 203 (2012); 565 U.S.
1195 (2012).
81. Barthé, supra note 15, at 82. Howard Winant has discussed racial revisionism in the
context of Brazil but has defined it as the tendency to reduce class to race. HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL CONDITIONS: POLITICS, THEORY, COMPARISONS 132 (1994).
82 . See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014).
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torting the jurisprudence of a person whose politics many liberals believe
have been injurious notwithstanding his admiration for Black nationalism.
The potential objections on the right are strong too. The undertheorized
version of Black nationalism offered in Enigma means that much of Justice
Thomas’s jurisprudence is reduced to race. Put another way, Justice Thomas
is racialized in severe ways that are undersubstantiated. The irony of this racial project is that it provides fodder for Justice Thomas’s suspicion of white
liberals and his critique that Black people are often understood in ways that
are racially demeaning. Moreover, the racial portrait of Justice Thomas offered in the book validates conservative claims that liberals carelessly inject
race in places where it may not be relevant. They might argue that the spectacular and nostalgic White Constitution described in Enigma is a transmogrification of garden-variety law and order, one that fundamentally
misunderstands how criminal law signals communities’ moral condemnation. 83 Whether it is conservatives of all racial stripes who are in denial about
the empirically demonstrated biases in the criminal justice system on one
end, or austerity-loving conservatives rethinking the shape of the penal system on the other, 84 there is a strong likelihood that some on the right may
object to the analysis offered in Enigma as racially confusing and distorting.
The Enigma of Clarence Thomas demonstrates the importance of critical
engagement with reserved judgment. But it creates a political and jurisprudential portrait that clashes with scholars of relevant fields and the figure at
the center of the inquiry. I am not of the belief that this book only obscures. 85
It does, however, displace more careful inquiries into race and racial subjugation. The best books on law and inequality marshal intellectual traditions
that force general audiences and intellectual travelers to think more deeply
about how categories like race (among others) govern our lives. Enigma’s politically simplified version of Black nationalism and engagement with Clarence Thomas’s jurisprudence takes us only to a partial arrival.

83 . See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 405 (1958).
84. HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 11 (2015).
85. Magnet, supra note 46 (“Some books enlighten. This one obscures.”).

